Enterprise AI agent security platforms: what peers are evaluating, what is proven, and where the gaps remain

Research current to 28 July 2026

Executive assessment

Enterprise buyers are not evaluating one homogeneous “AI agent security” market. They are testing at least three overlapping control planes:

1. **Data and traffic controls**—Cyberhaven, Nightfall, Forcepoint, Netskope, and Zscaler extend DLP, DSPM, endpoint, CASB/SSE, or gateway inspection into AI and MCP traffic.
2. **AI application and agent runtime controls**—Prompt Security, CalypsoAI, Lakera/Check Point, Protect AI/Prisma AIRS, Zenity, Noma Security, and HiddenLayer focus on prompts, model/application behavior, tool calls, agent posture, red teaming, or runtime enforcement.
3. **Identity and governance controls**—Astrix and Microsoft Agent 365 are strongest where the problem is inventory, ownership, OAuth/service-account permissions, lifecycle, and least privilege. Microsoft adds Purview DLP/DSPM and Defender telemetry inside its ecosystem; Astrix specializes in non-human identities (NHIs) across a broader collection of SaaS, cloud, and developer systems.

No public evidence supports declaring one platform the universal winner across internal systems, SaaS, APIs, databases, MCP servers, and third-party tools. The strongest *named production evidence* in this set is narrower than the broadest product claims: Dropbox says it selected and deployed Lakera after evaluating several vendors and internal options; Palo Alto Networks publishes named Prisma AIRS/AI Runtime endorsements from TELUS Digital, Glean, and Moveworks; Astrix lists named NHI customers and describes how Workday implemented NHI security; Netskope and Zscaler publish named GenAI/DLP deployments; and Prompt Security publishes named enterprise security-leader testimonials. These prove adoption of important components, but usually do **not** prove every agentic control in the current product.

The market is also consolidating quickly. Palo Alto Networks completed its acquisition of Protect AI in July 2025, Check Point completed Lakera’s acquisition in Q4 2025, SentinelOne reported completing Prompt Security’s acquisition in September 2025, and Cisco completed Astrix’s acquisition in June 2026 (Palo Alto Networks SEC filing, Check Point, SentinelOne SEC filing, Cisco). Buyers should evaluate the shipping, integrated product—not a legacy startup roadmap.

Bottom line for a CISO or enterprise architecture team

- **For broad sensitive-data protection around employee and agent use:** put Cyberhaven, Forcepoint, Netskope, Zscaler, and Nightfall on the data-control track. Netskope and Nightfall have especially explicit MCP traffic controls; Forcepoint and Cyberhaven emphasize existing DLP/DSPM context; Zscaler’s most agent-specific platform additions were announced only in June 2026 and need pilot validation.
- **For custom agents and inline model/tool-call protection:** shortlist Prisma AIRS, Prompt Security, Noma, and—where SaaS-managed agents dominate—Zenity. Lakera is a strong specialist comparator for prompt injection and input/output guardrails, but public evidence is less complete for OAuth entitlement reduction, general agent discovery, and tool-level least privilege.
- **For NHI, OAuth, and permission governance:** compare Astrix and Microsoft Agent 365, then test how each integrates with an inline runtime/data control. Agent 365 is compelling in Microsoft-centric estates but remains partly Frontier preview and Microsoft explicitly says it wraps third-party agents with identity, policy, and observability while **not controlling their internal runtime behavior** (Microsoft Learn).
- **Do not buy from a feature checklist alone.** Require a proof of value that follows one realistic transaction from untrusted content, through agent reasoning, identity and OAuth token use, to database/API/MCP tool calls, data egress, enforcement, and SIEM reconstruction.

Why the control problem is different for autonomous agents

An employee-facing chatbot creates a data-egress problem. An autonomous agent creates that problem **plus authority**: it can read an email containing hostile instructions, use an OAuth token, query a database, invoke an MCP tool, update a CRM, and transmit the result elsewhere. NIST describes agent hijacking as indirect prompt injection caused by failure to separate trusted instructions from untrusted data; its evaluations show this remains an active technical problem (NIST). OWASP’s peer-reviewed Top 10 for Agentic Applications adds goal hijacking, tool misuse, identity and privilege abuse, supply-chain compromise, memory/context poisoning, cascading failures, and rogue agents to the evaluation frame (OWASP).

This is already an operational, not merely theoretical, concern. A 2026 Cloud Security Alliance survey commissioned by Zenity reports that 53% of responding organizations had seen agents exceed intended permissions and 47% had experienced an AI-agent security incident in the prior year (CSA). Because the sponsor sells agent security, the figures should be treated as directional survey evidence, not neutral market sizing. Separately, Netskope telemetry covers 3,500-plus customers and tracked 317 distinct GenAI applications in its 2025 report, providing stronger observational evidence for shadow-AI proliferation, although it measures the vendor's customer base rather than all enterprises (Netskope Threat Labs).

The practical implication is that five control layers must work together:

- **Discover:** agents, models, MCP clients/servers/tools, OAuth apps, service accounts, API keys, owners, data stores, and reachable resources.
- **Assess:** configuration, supply chain, permissions, data sensitivity, prompt/tool attack paths, and business impact.
- **Constrain:** least-privilege scopes, short-lived credentials, allowlisted tools, network/data boundaries, and human approval for irreversible actions.
- **Inspect and enforce at runtime:** prompts, retrieved context, model output, memory operations, tool arguments/results, API/database calls, and egress.
- **Investigate:** identity-attributed, step-level telemetry in SIEM/SOAR with a complete chain from initiating human or service to final action.

Comparative capability map

The table is an evidence-based orientation, not a laboratory score. **Strong** means current primary documentation describes a concrete control and deployment point. **Partial** means adjacent coverage, limited ecosystem scope, or unclear enforcement. **Not evidenced** means this research found no sufficiently specific public proof; it does not mean the capability is absent. Nearly all capability statements are vendor claims unless a named deployment is cited later.

Platform	Discovery / posture	Runtime, prompt injection, tool abuse	Data: DLP / DSPM	NHI, OAuth, least privilege	MCP security	SIEM / operations	Best-fit evaluation hypothesis
Cyberhaven	Strong endpoint inventory claim for SaaS AI, IDE/CLI assistants, frameworks, and MCP servers	Partial: endpoint data lineage and AI policy; public detail on generic tool-call authorization is limited	**Strong DLP/data lineage**; DSPM adjacency	Partial; observes access but is not primarily an NHI governance platform	Partial-to-strong discovery; current public material is less specific than dedicated gateways on per-tool enforcement	Existing DLP/IRM console; validate export schema	Data-centric shadow-agent and endpoint use cases
Nightfall	Strong claim for MCP server/client discovery and registry/risk tracking	Strong claim for request/response inspection, anomalous access, and granular controls	**Strong DLP** for secrets, PII, code and tool traffic; DSPM is not the center of gravity	Partial: SSO/user authorization; validate OAuth entitlement remediation and credential brokering	**Strong, purpose-built MCP claim**	Audit-oriented; validate native connectors and field fidelity	Developer agents and MCP workflows with sensitive code/data
Forcepoint	Strong claim across sanctioned/shadow agents and endpoints	Strong new claim: action logging, approval gates, pause/revoke and agent gateway	**Strong DLP + DSPM** and classification inheritance	Strong claim for over-permission detection and short-lived gateway tokens; external NHI breadth unclear	Partial: agent gateway and MCP coverage are claimed, but public technical configuration is thinner	Compliance exports claimed; validate SIEM integration	Existing Forcepoint data-security customers seeking policy reuse
Prompt Security (SentinelOne)	Strong endpoint and gateway discovery of AI/MCP use	**Strong claimed inline inspection** for prompts, responses, MCP actions and policy enforcement	Strong content leakage controls; not a broad DSPM platform	Partial: user/server/action policy; not publicly proven as full NHI/OAuth lifecycle governance	**Strong MCP gateway and code/risk assessment claim**	Searchable audit logs; SentinelOne integration should be tested in the shipping SKU	Mixed employee, custom-app, coding-agent and MCP protection
CalypsoAI	Partial; public emphasis is inference layer and assessment, not enterprise-wide agent identity inventory	Strong red-teaming and inference protection claims; agentic attack packs	Partial-to-strong inference-layer leakage controls; not broad DSPM	Not evidenced beyond runtime policy	Not evidenced as a general MCP access-control or enforcement plane	Validate event export and response workflows	Adversarial testing and model/application guardrails
Lakera / Check Point	Limited for enterprise-wide agent discovery	**Strong specialist prompt-injection/input-output guardrail evidence**	Strong sensitive-information detection at inference; broader DLP comes from Check Point integrations	Limited public evidence for agent-specific OAuth/NHI least privilege	Partial: tool poisoning detection is discussed, but a general MCP access-control plane is not as well evidenced	Splunk/Grafana and audit integration claimed	Low-latency prompt/context protection embedded in custom AI apps
Protect AI / Prisma AIRS	**Strong lifecycle discovery claim** across cloud, SaaS, low/no-code, custom agents, models and MCP assets	**Strong runtime and red-team claim** for prompt injection, tool misuse and unsafe actions	Strong runtime data protection; Enterprise DLP integration; DSPM breadth should be scoped	Strong current claims for agent identity, excessive permissions, revocation and least privilege	**Strong documented MCP security gateway/server** inspecting inputs, outputs, descriptions and schemas	Strata Logging/Cloud Manager; mature SOC ecosystem	Broad custom AI lifecycle plus network/API/MCP enforcement
Astrix (Cisco)	**Strong NHI/agent discovery** across cloud, IdP, SaaS and DevOps	Strong identity-linked threat detection; weaker evidence for semantic prompt inspection	Partial: maps data/resource reach; not a content DLP/DSPM substitute	**Strongest identity-first specialization** for API keys, OAuth, service accounts, owners and permissions	Strong identity/secrets posture; validate inline tool-content enforcement	Cisco/Splunk integration direction; syslog telemetry integration documented	Agent identity, credential, OAuth and access-path governance
Zenity	**Strong for SaaS-managed agents** in Microsoft, Salesforce and ChatGPT ecosystems	Strong claim for step-level prompt, tool, memory and behavior detection/response	Partial: detects exposure and misconfiguration; not a general enterprise DLP/DSPM replacement	Strong SaaS agent permissions/posture claim; breadth outside supported platforms varies	Strong claim including MCP posture/runtime, but validate supported clients and enforcement modes	Designed for security operations; validate connector details	Copilot Studio/M365, Salesforce Agentforce and SaaS-agent governance
Noma Security	**Strong cross-lifecycle claim** for homegrown, SaaS, coding agents, MCP servers and tools	**Strong inline runtime claim**, including multi-step intent and destructive tool calls	Strong agent-context data/secret controls; broader DSPM exists in AI-SPM but should be benchmarked	Strong claimed access policy; identity lifecycle depth versus Astrix/Microsoft needs testing	**Strong tool-level MCP approval and runtime enforcement claim**	AI detection/response orientation; validate SIEM schema and latency	Broad agent security where tool-call intent and MCP enforcement matter

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HiddenLayer	Strong AI asset/model/application discovery heritage; current public detail on shadow-agent inventory is less complete	Strong AI detection/response, model/runtime threat and prompt-injection positioning	Partial: AI application leakage protection, not a broad enterprise DLP/DSPM suite	Limited evidence for NHI/OAuth governance and automated least privilege	Partial; current research discusses MCP input threats, but public product-level MCP enforcement detail is limited	SOC-oriented; validate supported exports	AI model/application defense and detection, paired with IAM/DLP controls
Netskope	**Strong network/endpoint AI and public MCP discovery**	Strong gateway guardrails and tool-traffic inspection; semantic multi-step agent intent needs validation	**Strong established DLP + DSPM** across SaaS/cloud and agent traffic	Partial: OAuth2 relay and zero-trust policy; not full NHI lifecycle governance	**Strong documented Agentic Broker/MCP Gateway**, including server/tool/resource/prompt policy	Mature SSE analytics and events	Existing Netskope estates needing broad data controls plus MCP traffic governance
Zscaler	Strong SSE visibility; AI Access Graph and agent discovery announced	Strong announced intent/multi-turn guardrails and agent traffic enforcement	**Strong DLP/DSPM heritage** and AI prompt extraction	Strong Zero Trust/NHI direction and Entra Agent ID partnership; verify shipping scope	MCP and A2A brokers announced June 2026; maturity proof is limited	Mature Zero Trust/SOC ecosystem	Existing Zscaler estates willing to pilot newly launched agentic controls
Microsoft Agent 365	**Strong tenant registry, owner, health, map and lifecycle governance**	Partial: Defender/Purview signals and controls, but Microsoft says Agent 365 does not control third-party agents' internal behavior	**Strong Purview DLP + DSPM for AI** in supported Microsoft workloads	**Strong Entra-native agent identity**, Conditional Access, access reviews and governance	MCP templates/tool controls exist; broad third-party MCP runtime inspection is not proven	Strong Microsoft Defender/Purview/Sentinel alignment	Microsoft-centric control plane, paired with runtime security for non-Microsoft agents

Platform-by-platform evidence and caveats

Cyberhaven

Verified evidence. Cyberhaven's 2025 AI Adoption and Risk Report says it is derived from billions of workflows observed by its Data Detection and Response platform. That is useful installed-base telemetry, not evidence that its newer autonomous-agent controls have been broadly deployed (Cyberhaven).

Vendor claims. Cyberhaven says its endpoint agent continuously inventories mainstream AI SaaS, IDE/CLI coding assistants, open-source frameworks, and MCP servers, and applies AI policy from the existing DLP/IRM console (product page). This is differentiated by data lineage: a prompt or file can be judged using origin, transformations, and business context rather than pattern matching alone. Its May 2026 shadow-agent material correctly identifies endpoint agents and local MCP as blind spots for network-only DLP (Cyberhaven).

Limitations to test. Public sources do not yet establish general-purpose OAuth scope reduction, per-tool authorization, credential brokering, or named deployments of the newest MCP/agent controls. A pilot should test local coding agents, subprocesses, encrypted traffic, tool calls that never traverse a browser, and SIEM preservation of lineage.

Nightfall

Verified evidence. Nightfall publishes a customer quotation from a legal-technology security leader describing MCP discovery through employee "self-confessions," which is credible problem evidence but anonymous. Its product page also presents quantified outcome examples, yet without named customers or independently described methods they remain vendor case material, not verified benchmark results.

Vendor claims. Nightfall says it tracks more than 20,000 MCP servers, provides request visibility, inventories MCP connections, integrates SSO, and applies DLP to requests and responses (Nightfall MCP Security). Its architecture targets code assistants and MCP workflows where secrets, PII, customer data, and source code cross the agent/tool boundary.

Limitations to test. Validate whether "discovery" includes local stdio MCP, containers, remote servers, configuration drift, and private registries; whether controls apply per tool and action rather than per server; and whether OAuth scopes are actually reduced or merely observed. Ask Nightfall to reproduce its numerical case-study results on the buyer's corpus and provide false-positive/false-negative methodology.

Forcepoint

Verified evidence. Forcepoint has a large installed DLP/data-security base and named customer stories, but its cited Medicover story demonstrates general DLP incident visibility rather than agent gateway deployment. The Claude Compliance API integration was announced as available in May 2026 (Forcepoint announcement).

Vendor claims. Forcepoint's current agentic page claims attribution of every action to an agent and triggering user, shadow-agent detection, pause/revoke/quarantine actions, over-permission flags, inline DLP, approval gates, and short-lived credential tokens through an AI Agent Gateway (Forcepoint). DSPM is used upstream to locate sensitive data and oversharing, while existing DLP policy is extended to prompts, outputs, and workflows.

Limitations to test. These unusually broad agent-specific claims are recent and lack named production references. Verify supported agent frameworks, SaaS applications, databases, MCP transports, token brokers, enforcement latency, immutable-log implementation, and whether "shadow" discovery works beyond endpoints Forcepoint manages.

Prompt Security (now SentinelOne)

Verified evidence. Prompt publishes named testimonials from HiBob, 10x Banking, St. Joseph's Healthcare Hamilton, and Upstream describing enterprise AI-use governance and data protection. Those are meaningful adoption signals, but they do not independently prove the newer MCP gateway. SentinelOne's SEC filing confirms the acquisition closed in September 2025 (SEC).

Vendor claims. Prompt's MCP Gateway uses an endpoint agent or reverse proxy to discover MCP, inspect requests/responses, assess server code and metadata, risk-score servers, block tools or parameters, sanitize responses, and keep searchable logs (technical launch, solution page). Its broader platform also covers employee AI, custom AI applications, code assistants, leakage and prompt injection.

Limitations to test. Confirm which capabilities are integrated into SentinelOne Singularity versus separately licensed, how local stdio interception works, whether policies follow workload identity rather than just user/device, and whether multi-step intent and OAuth entitlement risk are evaluated. Risk scores over public GitHub MCP servers do not substitute for scanning private/custom servers.

CalypsoAI

Verified evidence. Gartner's public 2024 AI TRiSM sample-vendor material included CalypsoAI, Prompt Security, and HiddenLayer, showing analyst recognition of the category, not product endorsement or customer deployment (Gartner webinar deck). CalypsoAI's release notes provide dated evidence that agentic attack packs shipped in its SaaS product (CalypsoAI support).

Vendor claims. CalypsoAI, now presented by F5 as F5 AI Red Team and F5 AI Guardrails, positions the technology around inference-layer protection and automated red teaming. F5 says its agent-powered attack packs generate and test adversarial prompts and are used to assess models, applications, and agents for risks including prompt injection and sensitive-data leakage (F5).

Limitations to test. Public sources are much stronger on pre-production adversarial testing and input/output protection than on enterprise-wide discovery, NHI/OAuth lifecycle, least privilege, and deterministic per-tool enforcement. The company's advertised ROI figures are modeled vendor content, not independently audited realized savings. Evaluate CalypsoAI as a testing/runtime specialist, not a presumed replacement for DLP, DSPM, IAM, or MCP access governance.

Lakera / Check Point

Verified evidence. Dropbox states that, after evaluating several AI security vendors and internal options, it deployed Lakera in its centralized LLM library. It reports centralized on-prem protection, very low latency, and detection of the vast majority of its injection/jailbreak tests, though it does not publish the test set, exact rate, or independent validation (Dropbox case study). An anonymous Fortune 500 EdTech case says two applications were deployed with a commitment to protect more than 20; because the customer is unnamed, this is weaker evidence (Lakera).

Vendor claims. Lakera Guard/Check Point AI Guardrails inspects inbound prompts, retrieved context, and outputs for direct/indirect injection, sensitive data, harmful content, and other model risks. Lakera claims 100-plus language coverage, sub-12 ms average latency, a 0.01% false-positive rate, audit logs, and Splunk/Grafana integrations (Lakera). These figures are vendor measurements until reproduced.

Limitations to test. The product is a strong prompt/context firewall candidate, but public evidence is thinner for autonomous-agent inventory, OAuth permission analysis, NHI lifecycle, DSPM, and general tool-call/MCP authorization. Check Point's wider portfolio may fill some gaps; require a single architecture and console demonstration rather than assuming portfolio integration.

Protect AI / Prisma AIRS

Verified evidence. Palo Alto Networks completed Protect AI's acquisition in July 2025; the company's Form 10-K says the acquisition was completed on 22 July 2025 and was expected to enhance its AI security platform (Palo Alto Networks SEC filing). Its public customer page includes named endorsements: TELUS Digital describes visibility into API calls and malicious detections by agent tools; Glean highlights data, malware, and AI security; Moveworks calls the platform essential (Prisma AIRS). These are vendor-hosted testimonials, but stronger than anonymous claims. The MCP Server was publicly testable in 2025 and now has operational documentation.

Vendor claims. Prisma AIRS claims discovery across SaaS, cloud, low/no-code and custom agents; artifact and MCP supply-chain scanning; behavioral red teaming; identity validation and over-privilege remediation; real-time prompt-injection, tool-misuse and data-leakage enforcement; and central control of LLM, tool, and MCP interactions (agent security). Product documentation says its MCP service validates tool inputs, outputs, descriptions and schemas and detects prompt injection, context poisoning, and exposed credentials (release documentation).

Limitations to test. Breadth creates integration and licensing complexity. Determine which functions are generally available, which require Software NGFW credits, Strata Logging, VM/CN-Series or API interception, and whether agent identity/least privilege depends on other Palo Alto/CyberArk components. Named testimonials should be followed by reference calls about actual agentic workloads, not only model/API security.

Astrix (now Cisco)

Verified evidence. Astrix publicly lists Workday, Xerox, HubSpot, Boomi, BigID, Workato, Mercury, Pagaya, and Guesty as NHI customers and provides a Workday implementation session (customer stories). An anonymous long-term customer case describes a 200-developer pilot of Vertex AI, ChatGPT Enterprise and Glean that produced roughly 400 GPTs in 1.5 months; Astrix says it found admin scopes, external API access, and a BigQuery credential exposing PII (Astrix case study). The detail is useful but remains vendor-reported and customer-anonymous. Cisco completed the acquisition in June 2026.

Vendor claims. Astrix maps agents to API keys, OAuth tokens, service accounts, permissions, reachable resources, human owners, and behavioral risk across cloud, identity, SaaS, and DevOps. Its Fortinet integration documents HTTPS log ingestion through syslog and identity enrichment (Astrix/Fortinet). Its research of more than 5,000 open-source MCP servers found that 88% required credentials, illustrating why MCP is an NHI problem, although the sample and result are vendor research (CSA CloudBytes description).

Limitations to test. Astrix is not a replacement for semantic prompt-injection detection or content DLP. Test credential vault integration, OAuth scope remediation, just-in-time tokens, revocation time, identity correlation across chained agents, and whether Cisco/Splunk integrations are shipping after acquisition.

Zenity

Verified evidence. Zenity provides an anonymous Fortune 20 technology-company testimonial about scaled remediation. The CSA survey it commissioned is credible peer-adoption/risk evidence but is not evidence that respondents used Zenity. Zenity has also published reproducible security research and coordinated disclosure, which supports technical expertise rather than production adoption.

Vendor claims. For Microsoft 365 Copilot, Copilot Studio, ChatGPT Enterprise, and Salesforce Agentforce, Zenity claims discovery, configuration/permission posture, step-level telemetry across prompt processing, tool calls, memory and user interaction, and real-time containment of excessive tools, restricted-data access and chained prompts (Zenity SaaS-managed agents). Its Govern and Defend products combine AI security posture management with AI detection and response.

Limitations to test. Coverage depth may be platform-specific. Ask for an exact support matrix for each SaaS agent, custom framework, MCP transport, action type, and enforcement response. Validate whether “real time” is inline blocking or API-driven containment, how fast it acts, and whether data classification comes from Zenity or an integrated DLP/DSPM source.

Noma Security

Verified evidence. Noma states that Fortune 100 enterprises use the platform and describes a Microsoft Copilot Studio inline integration, but the cited customers are not named (Noma). Its June 2026 Kong partnership is independently checkable as an integration announcement, not proof of joint production use.

Vendor claims. Noma’s Agentic Access Control claims continuous inventory of agents, MCP servers and tools; ownership/permission context; approval policies by tool, agent, user, team and environment; and runtime enforcement when connections occur (Noma platform). Its Cursor hooks inspect commands, working directories, environment context, file paths, secrets, and MCP calls before execution (Noma). Noma also claims multi-step behavioral detection—for example, correlating a permitted customer-record read with a later external send.

Limitations to test. Many capabilities are recent and customer proof is anonymous. Require demonstrations across the buyer’s actual Copilot Studio, Bedrock/Foundry, Cursor, MCP, API gateway, and database paths. Measure blocking latency, bypass resistance, false positives, outage behavior, identity propagation, and the completeness of SIEM reconstruction.

HiddenLayer

Verified evidence. HiddenLayer’s inclusion in Gartner’s 2024 AI TRiSM sample-vendor material provides analyst-category recognition. Public research on recent agent incidents demonstrates relevant threat expertise, but is not evidence of product deployment (HiddenLayer).

Vendor claims. HiddenLayer’s platform heritage is AI asset discovery, model scanning, adversarial testing, and AI detection and response. It positions runtime protection around AI application/model threats, prompt injection and anomalous behavior.

Limitations to test. Among the compared platforms, public evidence was least specific on agent-wide OAuth/NHI governance, least-privilege remediation, MCP discovery and per-tool enforcement. HiddenLayer may be valuable for model/application security, but buyers should not infer broad agent control from “AI runtime” language. Request named references and a tool-call-level architecture.

Netskope

Verified evidence. Netskope says its Threat Labs report observes more than 3,500 customers; its telemetry demonstrates enterprise AI-app use at meaningful scale. TEPCO Energy Partner adopted Netskope for visibility, DLP and secure web/cloud controls in an AI-driven contact-center context, although the case does not prove Agentic Broker deployment (TEPCO EP). Agentic Broker documentation is publicly available, providing stronger shipping-product evidence than a press announcement alone.

Vendor claims. Netskope One Agentic Broker continuously discovers remote MCP servers, clients, tools, resources and prompts (Netskope). Its documented MCP Gateway can allow/block by server, tool, resource, prompt, activity or token group; inspect tool arguments, results and resources with DLP; apply guardrails and rate limits; relay OAuth2; inspect SSE streams; and write

MCP-specific events (Netskope documentation). Netskope One adds established SaaS/cloud DLP and DSPM.

Limitations to test. Public-server and network visibility may miss local stdio, private east-west traffic, encrypted agent subprocesses, or direct SaaS platform calls unless the relevant client/gateway/API integration is present. OAuth relay is not the same as entitlement governance. Test local MCP, private servers, agent-to-agent traffic, multi-step intent, and SIEM trace continuity.

Zscaler

Verified evidence. Repsol publicly describes using Zscaler DLP to enable GenAI adoption (Repsol); that supports the data-control foundation, not the newest agentic platform. Zscaler's internal case study describes endpoint DLP and AI Guard in operational use, but self-use is weaker peer evidence (Zscaler on Zscaler).

Vendor claims. In June 2026 Zscaler announced AI Broker for MCP/A2A communications, AI Access Graph to connect data and identity lineage, agentic endpoint controls, prompt extraction for more than 250 GenAI apps, compliance APIs, and intent-based multi-turn guardrails (Zscaler announcement). Its Microsoft integration brief describes participation as an early adoption partner for Entra Agent ID (Zscaler/Microsoft).

Limitations to test. The agent-specific controls are too new for strong public production evidence. Separate generally available functions from preview/roadmap, and test whether the platform identifies individual agent/workload identity, governs OAuth permissions, intercepts local MCP, blocks individual tool calls, and correlates multi-step actions rather than only inspecting traffic.

Microsoft Agent 365

Verified evidence. Agent 365 documentation is unusually candid about maturity: key functions are in the Frontier preview and may change (Microsoft Learn). The May 2026 preview includes agents with their own Entra identities and Microsoft 365 governance controls. This is verifiable product documentation, but public named peer deployment evidence remains limited.

Vendor claims and documented scope. Agent 365 provides a registry, ownership, activity/health, lifecycle actions, access control, permissions/reviews, Entra identity and Conditional Access, Purview data protection, and Defender threat signals (overview). Purview documentation says supported agent workloads can receive classification, DLP, DSPM for AI, Insider Risk, eDiscovery, lifecycle management, and logs for human-agent, agent-tool and agent-agent interactions (Microsoft Learn).

Microsoft describes three access modes: delegated user access, application permissions, and an agent's own persistent identity. It explicitly warns that an agent with its own identity can accumulate access and might disclose content to users who lack the original access unless guardrails exist. Crucially, Microsoft says Agent 365 is platform-agnostic and "doesn't enforce runtime behavior" inside third-party agents; it supplies identity, policy and observability around them (Microsoft Learn).

Limitations to test. Establish which registry connectors discover non-Microsoft/custom agents, which controls are GA, what licensing is required, whether tool controls cover arbitrary MCP servers and third-party SaaS, and how Sentinel reconstructs a full agent execution. Pair Agent 365 with an inline runtime control where prompt injection, tool semantics, or non-Microsoft execution must be blocked.

Evidence of peer evaluation and adoption: a conservative reading

Evidence strength	Platforms with public signals	What it proves—and does not prove
Named evaluation followed by deployment	**Lakera:** Dropbox says it evaluated several vendors and internal options, then deployed Lakera centrally	Strong evidence for low-latency prompt/jailbreak protection in Dropbox's custom architecture; not proof of agent discovery, NHI, or MCP authorization
Named customer deployment/testimonial relevant to AI security	**Prisma AIRS:** TELUS Digital, Glean, Moveworks; **Prompt Security:** HiBob, 10x Banking, St. Joseph's Healthcare Hamilton, Upstream; **Netskope:** TEPCO EP; **Zscaler:** Repsol	Confirms buyer interest/use of part of the platform. Vendor-hosted testimony and use-case scope require reference checks
Named adjacent installed base	**Astrix:** Workday and other NHI customers; **Forcepoint:** named DLP customers	Supports identity/data-control maturity, not automatic proof that new agent features are deployed
Anonymous enterprise/Fortune case	Astrix, Zenity, Noma, Lakera EdTech, Nightfall	Useful workflow detail, but identity and results cannot be independently checked
Shipping docs, preview, or public testing	Netskope Agentic Broker/MCP Gateway; Prisma AIRS MCP; CalypsoAI agentic attack packs; Microsoft Agent 365 Frontier; Zscaler June 2026 agentic launch	Proves a product surface exists or can be tested. Preview/announcement is not production maturity
Analyst/category evidence	Gartner AI TRiSM Market Guide/category; public sample material includes CalypsoAI, Prompt Security and HiddenLayer	Validates the buying category, not a ranking or endorsement
Installed-base telemetry / sponsored survey	Netskope, Cyberhaven; CSA/Zenity survey	Supports prevalence and risk hypotheses. Samples are vendor customer bases or sponsor-influenced and are not product efficacy studies

The evidence record is therefore uneven. "Peer organizations are evaluating" is directly demonstrated for Lakera/Dropbox and in Astrix's anonymous multi-platform pilot. For most others, public records show adoption of a related platform, vendor-hosted customer testimony, an anonymous pilot, or a newly testable product—not a disclosed head-to-head enterprise bake-off. Procurement teams should treat any claim of widespread agent-security production deployment as unverified unless the vendor supplies reference customers with comparable architectures.

How to run a defensible enterprise evaluation

1. Split the proof of value into control planes

Run parallel workstreams for (a) data discovery/DLP/DSPM, (b) agent/application runtime, (c) NHI/OAuth/least privilege, and (d) control-plane/SIEM integration. A vendor can win more than one track, but every control must have an observable enforcement point. This prevents a strong CASB from being mistaken for a tool-authorization system, or a prompt classifier from being mistaken for access governance.

2. Use one realistic attack-and-business workflow

Build a test agent that:

1. reads an internal SharePoint page or email containing an indirect prompt injection;
2. retrieves regulated customer data from a database through an MCP server;
3. uses an over-scoped OAuth token to query Salesforce or Google Drive;
4. calls a third-party ticketing or messaging tool;
5. attempts a permitted read followed several steps later by an unapproved external write;
6. requests a destructive action that should require human approval; and
7. rotates tools or modifies an MCP description after initial approval.

Score whether the platform discovers every component, identifies the human and workload identity, recognizes sensitive data, detects the malicious instruction, constrains tools/scopes, blocks the final action, and reconstructs the chain in SIEM. NIST's framing makes clear why testing only the initiating prompt is inadequate: hostile instructions can arrive through retrieved data and tool output (NIST).

3. Demand measured results

For each scenario record:

- discovery coverage and time-to-inventory;
- true/false positives on a buyer-owned multilingual prompt, document, code, and secret corpus;
- p50/p95/p99 latency and throughput for prompts and tool calls;
- local stdio, SSE, streamable HTTP, remote/private MCP, API gateway, SaaS-native, endpoint and east-west coverage;
- fail-open/fail-closed behavior and regional availability;
- credential residence, token lifetime, revocation time, scope reduction and owner attribution;
- action granularity: server, tool, method, argument, data object, destination and business intent;
- SIEM field completeness, correlation ID persistence, retention, redaction and replay;
- API availability, policy-as-code, change control and evidence export; and
- licensing cost per user, endpoint, agent, application, token, call, gateway and data volume.

Vendor accuracy, latency, server-count, ROI, and "first/only" claims should be reproduced. None of the cited marketing measurements is a substitute for a buyer-run test.

4. Apply explicit go/no-go gates

A production agent touching sensitive data should not pass if it lacks a unique owner and identity, uses a shared long-lived credential, has unbounded tool access, cannot produce step-level logs, or cannot be stopped before a high-impact action. Human approval is especially appropriate for irreversible writes, external communications, financial transactions, permission changes, and bulk exports. Least privilege reduces the blast radius even when prompt-injection detection fails.

Recommended shortlists by architecture

Microsoft-heavy enterprise: Agent 365 for registry, Entra identity, access reviews and Purview; compare Zenity and Noma for deeper Copilot Studio/SaaS runtime; include Prisma AIRS or Prompt Security where custom/non-Microsoft agents and MCP require inline controls. Do not assume Agent 365 alone controls third-party internal behavior.

Existing SSE/data-security estate: first pilot the incumbent—Netskope, Zscaler, Forcepoint or Cyberhaven—because policy/classification reuse can reduce operational friction. Add Nightfall or Prompt Security for developer endpoints/MCP if the incumbent cannot intercept local or semantic tool traffic. Keep an NHI track with Astrix or the enterprise IAM platform.

Custom AI applications and model pipelines: compare Prisma AIRS, Prompt Security, Noma, Lakera and CalypsoAI. Weight Prisma AIRS for lifecycle breadth, Prompt/Noma for agent/MCP enforcement, Lakera for low-latency prompt/context defense, and CalypsoAI for adversarial testing. HiddenLayer belongs in the evaluation when model/app detection and response is primary, but

require explicit proof for NHI and MCP controls.

Identity-first risk: compare Astrix with Microsoft Entra/Agent 365 (and the organization's existing PAM/workload-identity stack). Pair the winner with DLP/DSPM and inline runtime inspection. Identity controls cap authority; they do not determine whether retrieved content is a malicious instruction.

Limitations of this research

This assessment uses public material available on 28 July 2026. Much agent-specific functionality launched in 2025–2026, so independent comparative tests and named production references are scarce. Vendor documentation establishes claimed scope and, where detailed configuration exists, stronger evidence of a shipping surface; it does not prove detection accuracy, bypass resistance, scalability, or customer deployment. Vendor-hosted case studies may be selectively reported, anonymous cases cannot be independently verified, and sponsored surveys may reflect sponsor framing. Gartner's full research is paywalled, so this article uses only its public abstract and publicly accessible sample-vendor material and does not infer rankings.

Acquisitions also make brand boundaries fluid: Protect AI is now part of Prisma AIRS, Lakera is part of Check Point, Prompt Security is part of SentinelOne, and Astrix is part of Cisco. Roadmaps, packaging and integrations can change faster than public case evidence. All buyers should confirm general availability, regional support, licensing and referenceability in writing.

Practical conclusion

The most credible buying strategy is a **layered control architecture**, not a single-logo wager. Use DLP/DSPM to know and constrain the data, NHI/IAM to constrain authority, and agent-runtime/MCP controls to inspect intent and action. Feed all three into a SIEM with a durable correlation chain.

For an immediate enterprise bake-off, a balanced group would be:

- **Prisma AIRS, Prompt Security and Noma** for cross-environment runtime and MCP/tool controls;
- **Netskope or the incumbent Forcepoint/Zscaler/Cyberhaven platform** for data and traffic control;
- **Astrix or Microsoft Agent 365** for NHI/OAuth/ownership and least privilege;
- **Zenity** when Microsoft/Salesforce/ChatGPT SaaS agents are central; and
- **Lakera** as a specialist benchmark for prompt-injection detection and latency.

Nightfall deserves inclusion for MCP-heavy developer estates. CalypsoAI and HiddenLayer are better treated as specialist evaluation candidates unless they demonstrate the buyer's required identity, data and tool-action controls end to end. The final choice should follow measured proof—not category labels, acquisition halo, or vendor-asserted feature breadth.

Visual assets

Prompt Security: AI gateway inspection point



Figure 1. Architecture diagram showing an application calling an LLM through Prompt Security, which evaluates prompt injection and data leakage.

Credit: Prompt Security, from "Security for Agentic AI: Unveiling MCP Gateway & MCP Risk Assessment". Vendor architecture diagram; useful for illustrating an inline model-traffic enforcement point, not independent efficacy evidence.

Prompt Security: MCP tool-call enforcement flow



Figure 2. Architecture diagram showing an agentic AI workflow in which an MCP Gateway evaluates tool calls, enforces allow or block policy, and logs outcomes.

Credit: Prompt Security, from "Security for Agentic AI: Unveiling MCP Gateway & MCP Risk Assessment". Vendor architecture diagram; useful for distinguishing LLM inspection from MCP/tool-call inspection.

Only these two source-provided technical diagrams met the bar for direct, reusable visuals. Other reviewed pages primarily supplied decorative imagery, logos, videos, or diagrams without stable direct image URLs; they are intentionally omitted.

Sources

Claim supported	Evidence type	Source	Direct URL
Agent hijacking is indirect prompt injection through untrusted ingested data; evaluation remains necessary	U.S. government technical guidance	NIST, “Strengthening AI Agent Hijacking Evaluations”	https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2025/01/technical-blog-strengthening-ai-agent-hijacking-evaluations
Agentic risks include goal hijacking, tool misuse, identity abuse and supply-chain compromise	Peer-reviewed open security framework	OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications 2026	https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications-for-2026/
53% reported permission overrun and 47% an agent incident; sponsor caveat applies	Nonprofit-published, vendor-commissioned survey	Cloud Security Alliance / Zenity	https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/press-releases/2026/04/16/more-than-half-of-organizations-experience-ai-agent-scope-violations-cloud-security-alliance-study-finds
AI TRiSM is a recognized analyst buying category	Analyst research abstract	Gartner Market Guide for AI TRiSM, 18 Feb 2025	https://www.gartner.com/en/documents/6185655
Public sample AI TRiSM vendor material included CalypsoAI, Prompt Security and HiddenLayer	Analyst presentation	Gartner webinar deck	https://s3.amazonaws.com/bizzabo.file.upload/Oo84Qa23RBm3LQiHcApc_Jun24ALitanJDHoinne.pdf
Cyberhaven installed-base AI workflow telemetry	Vendor telemetry report	Cyberhaven 2025 AI Adoption and Risk Report	https://www.cyberhaven.com/resources/report/2025-ai-adoption-risk-report
Cyberhaven claims endpoint discovery of AI tools/frameworks/MCP and DLP-console governance	Primary product page	Cyberhaven AI Security	https://www.cyberhaven.com/product/ai-security
Nightfall claims MCP discovery, request visibility, SSO and DLP	Primary product page	Nightfall MCP Security	https://www.nightfall.ai/products/mcp-security
Forcepoint claims action attribution, gateway tokens, approvals, DLP/DSPM and agent controls	Primary product page	Forcepoint Agentic AI Security	https://www.forcepoint.com/use-case/agentic-ai-security
Claude Compliance API integration is available for Forcepoint customers	Vendor availability announcement	Forcepoint	https://www.forcepoint.com/newsroom/2026/forcepoint-extends-unified-ai-and-data-security-claude-enterprise-stopping-risk
Prompt MCP Gateway architecture, inspection, risk assessment and enforcement	Primary technical announcement	Prompt Security	https://prompt.security/blog/security-for-agentic-ai-unveiling-mcp-gateway-mcp-risk-assessment
Prompt product covers endpoint/reverse-proxy MCP discovery and runtime control	Primary product page	Prompt Security	https://prompt.security/solutions/agentic-ai-security-and-governance
SentinelOne completed Prompt Security acquisition in September 2025	Regulatory filing	SentinelOne Form 10-Q	https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1583708/000158370825000159/s-20251031.htm
CalypsoAI shipped agentic attack packs	Product release notes	CalypsoAI	https://support.calypsoai.com/en/release-notes-july-24-2025-v8.254.1
CalypsoAI/F5 claims agent-powered red-team attack packs test models, applications and agents for prompt-injection and data-leakage risks	Primary vendor technical article	F5 Agentic Signature Attack Packs	https://www.f5.com/company/blog/agentic-signature-attack-packs
Dropbox evaluated alternatives and deployed Lakera	Named vendor-hosted customer case	Lakera / Dropbox	https://www.lakera.ai/customer/securing-dropbox-genai-innovation-against-prompt-injection-jailbreak-attacks
Lakera prompt-injection, latency, false-positive and SIEM claims	Primary product/risk page	Lakera	https://www.lakera.ai/risk/prompt-injection-attacks
Check Point completed Lakera acquisition in Q4 2025	Public-company results	Check Point	https://www.checkpoint.com/press-releases/check-point-software-reports-fourth-quarter-and-2025-full-year-results/
Palo Alto Networks completed the Protect AI acquisition on 22 July 2025	Public-company regulatory filing	Palo Alto Networks Form 10-K	https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1327567/000132756725000027/panw-20250731.htm
Prisma AIRS named customer testimonials and runtime platform claims	Vendor product/customer page	Palo Alto Networks Prisma AIRS	https://www2.paloaltonetworks.com/prisma/prisma-ai-runtime-security
Prisma AIRS agent discovery, identity, least privilege, tool and runtime claims	Primary product page	Prisma AIRS Agent Security	https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/prisma/agent-security
Prisma AIRS MCP service inspects tool inputs, outputs and schemas	Product documentation	Palo Alto Networks	https://docs.paloaltonetworks.com/ai-runtime-security/new-features/by-date/prisma-airs/september-2025
Astrix named NHI customers and Workday implementation signal	Customer-story index	Astrix	https://astrix.security/learn/customer-stories/
Anonymous enterprise piloted Vertex AI, ChatGPT Enterprise and Glean; Astrix reported identity/access findings	Detailed anonymous vendor case	Astrix	https://astrix.security/learn/blog/case-study-how-a-major-brand-scaled-ai-agent-governance-with-astrix-nhi-security/
Astrix identity enrichment with network telemetry	Integration architecture	Astrix / Fortinet	https://astrix.security/learn/blog/astrix-and-fortinet-combining-network-visibility-with-identity-context-for-ai-agent-security/
Cisco completed Astrix acquisition in June 2026	Acquirer announcement	Cisco	https://blogs.cisco.com/news/cisco-announces-intent-to-acquire-astrix-security
Zenity claims SaaS-agent posture and step-level runtime defense	Primary product page	Zenity	https://zenity.io/use-cases/agent-type/saas-managed
Noma claims tool-level MCP approval and runtime enforcement	Primary product page	Noma Agentic Access Control	https://noma.security/platform/agentic-access-control/
Noma documents Cursor hook inspection of commands, files and MCP calls	Primary technical announcement	Noma	https://noma.security/blog/securing-the-agentic-frontier-noma-unveils-the-first-real-time-agent-runtime-security-for-cursor/
HiddenLayer agent threat analysis and recommended controls	Vendor research	HiddenLayer	https://www.hiddenlayer.com/research/ai-agents-in-production-security-lessons-from-recent-incidents
Netskope telemetry covers 3,500+ customers and 317 GenAI apps	Vendor installed-base research	Netskope Threat Labs	https://www.netskope.com/resources/reports-guides/cloud-and-threat-report-generative-ai-2025
Netskope Agentic Broker discovery and inventory claims	Primary product page	Netskope	https://www.netskope.com/products/agentic-broker
Netskope MCP Gateway policies, DLP, guardrails, OAuth relay and logging	Product documentation	Netskope	https://docs.netskope.com/en/mcp-gateway-overview

Claim supported	Evidence type	Source	Direct URL
TEPCO EP uses Netskope visibility/DLP in an AI-driven service environment	Named vendor-hosted case	Netskope / TEPCO EP	https://www.netskope.com/es/resources/case-studies/tepco-ep
Zscaler announced MCP/A2A brokers, AI Access Graph and multi-turn controls in June 2026	Public-company product announcement	Zscaler	https://www.zscaler.com/press/zscaler-unveils-new-product-innovations-secure-agentic-ai
Repsol uses Zscaler DLP to enable GenAI	Named vendor-hosted case	Zscaler / Repsol	https://www.zscaler.com/customers/repsol
Agent 365 registry, governance and security scope	Product documentation	Microsoft Learn	https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-agent-365/overview
Agent access modes; Agent 365 does not control third-party internal runtime behavior	Product documentation with explicit limitation	Microsoft Learn	https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-agent-365/share
Purview DLP, DSPM and audit coverage for supported agent workloads	Product documentation	Microsoft Learn	https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-365/agents/data-governance-purview
Agent 365 features are Frontier preview and subject to change	Preview documentation	Microsoft Learn	https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-agent-365/use